PROBLEMS 

of 

The  Pacific  and  The  Far  East 


By 

Sidney  L.  GULICK,  Secretary 

COMMISSION  ON  INTERNATIONAL  JUSTICE  AND  GOOD-WILL 

OF  THE 

FEDERAL  COUNCIL  OF  THE  CHURCHES  OF  CHRIST 

IN  AMERICA 


105  East  22nd  Street 
New  York 


Foreword 


HRISTIANS  have  special  reasons  lor  interest  in  the  success  of  the 
1 Conference  on  Limitation  of  Armament.  For  the  success  or  failure  of 

the  Christian  movement  in  the  Far  East  is  inextricably  bound  up  with 
^ Its  results.  If  causes  of  irritation  between  America  and  Japan  are 

not  removed,  if  unregulated  rivalry  in  China  continues  as  in  the  past 
^ between  powerful  nations  for  special  privilege  and  control,  if  jealousy 

and  fear  are  allowed  to  grow  and  spread  until  they  lead  at  last  to  armed  conflict,  not 
only  would  we  all  be  plunged  into  the  unspeakable  evils  of  every  war,  suffering  enor- 
mous economic  losses  and  incurring  inconceivable  financial  expenses,  but  such  con- 
flict would  sound  the  death-knell  of  the  great  missionary  enterprise  in  the  Far  East. 
The  value  of  this  enterprise,  however,  cannot  easily  be  overstated.  Through  many 
decades  of  unselfish  service,  it  has  been  breaking  down  the  barriers  of  race,  bringing 
the  great  peoples  of  the  East  and  the  West  into  relations  of  mutual  understanding 
and  good-will,  and  building  up  a real  international  brotherhood. 


The  one  real  and  only  hope  of  bridging  the  age-old  chasm  between  the  East  and 
the  West  lies  in  the  practice  of  that  spirit  of  service  and  brotherhood  which  consti- 
tutes the  center  and  essence  of  the  Christian  way  of  life.  Capitalistic,  commercial 
and  political  contacts  of  East  and  West  often  tend  to  deepen  the  natural  gulf  between 
the  great  and  powerful  races  and  widely  differing  civilization  of  these  two  streams  of 
human  history.  It  is  the  spirit  of  Christ  alone  that  can  reconcile  the  races,  overcome 
and  annul  their  ancient  grudges,  banish  their  inherited  prejudices  and  bring  peoples 
and  nations  into  such  relations  of  mutual  confidence  and  good-will  that  their  commer- 
cial and  financial  relations  can  permanently  go  forward  to  their  mutual  advantage. 


Wide-awake  American  Christians,  therefore,  who  through  their  great  Church 
M ission  Boards  are  maintaining  in  Japan  a thousand  Christian  missionaries  and 
3,600  in  China,  regard  the  Conference  in  Washington  from  a standpoint  quite  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  the  capitalist  and  the  trader.  The  Conference  at  Washington  is, 
in  fact,  fraught  with  the  gravest  possibilities  for  weal  or  woe,  for  world  prosperity 
or  for  world  disaster,  for  reconciling  or  embroiling  the  yellow  and  the  white  races. 
The  most  “vital  interest”  America  has  in  the  Pacific  is  indeed  the  establishment  of 
right  attitudes  of  mind  and  heart  between  America  and  the  Far  East.  The  Federal 
Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  America  has  for  many  years  maintained  a Com- 
mission on  Relations  with  the  Orient,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  promoting  these  “vital 
interests. 


It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Christian  interests  in  the  Washington  Conference 
far  exceed  in  intrinsic  and  permanent  importance  those  of  all  bankers,  manufactur- 
ers and  traders  cortibined.  Christians  in  all  parts  of  America  should  realize  the  true 
significance  of  their  interest  and  be  not  slow  nor  reticent  in  holding  the  Conference 
to  the  adoption  of  those  high  moral  ideals  in  international  life  which  can  alone  save 
modern  civilization  from  destruction. 


The  discussion  of  the  following  pages  has  been  prepared  especially  for  young 
people  and  for  busy  men  and  women  in  our  churches  who  desire  to  understand  the 
real  situation  in  the  Far  East,  but  who  have  not  the  time  for  extended  reading  of 
many  large  volumes.  The  necessary  brevity  has  prevented  elaboration  of  any  single 
topic.  Effort  has  been  made,  however,  to  give  sufficient  statement  of  the  most  sig- 
nificant historical  events  to  enable  the  student  to  know  what  the  situation  has  been 
and  is  today,  and  to  form  his  own  judgments. 


Introduction 


SECRETARY  HUGHES’  courageous  and  concrete  proposals  for  reducing  the 
navies  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  have  already  relieved  much 
international  tension.  Their  actual  acceptance  will  show  that  the  three  nations  con- 
cerned are  determined  to  settle  the  difficulties  by  methods  of  reason,  justice  and  good- 
will. 

It  is  important,  however,  that  Americans  should  familiarize  themselves  with  the 
main  elements  of  the  Far  Eastern  Problem.  For  although  the  proposal  to  reduce  all 
navies  creates  the  right  psychological  background,  it  does  not  of  itself  alone  solve  this 
intricate  and  difficult  question.  Its  solution  will  require  the  utmost  skill  and  patience. 

To  understand  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Problems,  one  needs  to  know  both 
a wide  field  of  historical  and  geographical  background  and  also  the  nature  of  the 
forces  at  work  creating  those  problems. 

There  are  four  principal  centers  to  the  exceedingly  complicated  situation  that 
exists  today  in  East  Asia. 

China  with  her  vast  homogeneous  and  industrious  population,  her  fabulous  and 
undeveloped  natural  resources,  her  enormous  possibilities  of  industrial  and  commer- 
cial development  together  with  her  impotence  and  her  ignorance,  incites  the  natural 
desire  of  enterprising  interests  of  other  lands  to  possess  themselves  of  as  large  a 
share  as  possible  of  the  opportunities  and  privileges  to  be  secured. 

Alert  and  aggressive  interests  of  England,  Russia,  France  and  Germany  in  the 
front  rank,  and  those  of  Holland,  Spain,  and  Portugal  in  the  second  rank  have  for 
many  decades  been  establishing  points  of  contact  and  control.  They  have  developed 
a large  number  of  vested  interests,  “rights,”  “concessions,”  “settlements”  and  the  like. 

Japan,  a latecomer  among  the  modernized,  industrial,  militaristic  nations,  chal- 
lenges the  European  domination  of  China  and  indeed  of  all  East  Asia. 

The  United  States,  though  an  early  trader  in  China,  is  the  latest  to  make  vigor- 
ous claims  which  she  believes  to  be  her  right  and  also  to  be  for  the  real  interests  of  all. 
She  is  asking  for  justice  and  fair  treatment  of  all  by  all.  Her  claims,  nevertheless, 
disturb  the  accustomed  ideas,  methods  and  diplomacy  of  all  the  other  nations  in  their 
relations  with  China. 

In  general  terms  the  fundamental  element  in  all  these  problems  is  economic — 
conflicting  desires,  policies  and  ambitions  for  trade,  for  special  rights,  or  for  exclu- 
sive control  of  opportunities  for  the  acquisition  of  wealth  and  power. 

The  friendly  solution  of  these  intricate  problems  is  a vital  necessity  for  the  en- 
tire world.  It  ean  be  found,  however,  only  by  mutual  general  agreements  among  all 
the  powers,  ineluding  China  herself.  Methods  must  be  adopted  for  insuring  justice, 
fair-dealing  and  unhampered  opportunity  for  all.  And  above  all,  China’s  own  welfare 
must  stand  supreme  above  all  other  considerations. 


3 


I*  China’s  Problems 


For  a century  China  has  been  slowly  changing  under  the  impact  of  modern,  occi- 
dental civilization.  Her  national  Government  has  completely  collapsed.  Her 
recent  efforts  to  establish  a new  one,  fitted  to  the  new  age,  have  not  yet  succeeded. 
China’s  national  political  life  and  institutions  are  in  ruins. 

By  the  adoption  in  1905  of  the  Occidental  system  of  education,  China  began  to 
adapt  herself  to  modern  world  conditions.  She  is  at  least  fifty  years  behind  Japan. 
This  is  why  China  is  a world  problem.  She  is  ignorant  and  impotent.  She  is  open 
to  the  greed  and  cupidity  of  foreigners.  She  cannot  control  them  nor  protect  her- 
self. They  accordingly  have  been  taking  what  they  could  and  imposing  upon  her  all 
kinds  of  conditions  and  restrictions,  securing  “rights,”  “concessions,”  and  “settle- 
ments” and  even  takina’  more  or  less  control  of  her  territory  and  her  governmental 


administrative  functions. 

Some  of  these  foreigia  aggi’essions  have  been 
contemptible  and  treacherous  beyond  measure. 
But  the  final  cause  of  the  trouble  has  been 
China’s  own  ignorance  of  the  modern  world,  her 
backward  government,  national  pride,  corrupt 
officials,  and  her  consequent  incompetence  in 
dealing  with  the  outside  woidd. 

Until  the  new  China  arises,  able  to  take  ef- 
ficient control  of  her  own  affairs,  both  internal 
and  international,  she  will  inevitably  be  either 
an  international  danger  zone  for  rival  nations, 
or  an  international  ward. 

From  the  standpoint  of  intelligent  and  patri- 
otic Chinese,  what  then  are  Cliina’s  principal 
problems? 

Internallv,  they  are  such  as  these:  establish- 
ment of  a real  and  effective  national  Govern- 
ment ; maintenance  of  order ; an  adequate  sys- 
tem of  railroads ; development  of  natural  re- 
sources, mines,  water  power  and  afforestation ; 
control  of  the  rivers ; a comprehensive  educa- 
tional system ; an  adequate  finance  system ; eco- 
nomic development ; a proper  budget  and  an 
effective  system  of  taxation. 

Internationally  they  include  such  items  as  the 
following: — recovery  of  tariff  and  judicial  au- 
tonomy ; recovery  of  administrative  control  of 
the  customs,  salt  gabelle,  post  office,  etc. ; politi- 
cal and  economic  recovery  of  Shantung,  Man- 
churia, Mongolia,  Thibet  and  other  areas ; 
abolition  of  “foreign  settlements”  with  foreign 
police  and  foreign  invasion  of  Chinese  sover- 
eignty; recovery  to  Chinese  ownership  of  all 
special  concessions  for  railroads  and  mines 
which  menace  her  sovereignty  and  the  integrity 
of  her  territory;  overthrow'  of  corrupt  and 
traitorous  officials  who  sell  out  to  foreign  seek- 


ers of  rights  and  concessions.  China’s  achieve- 
ment of  a stable,  intelligent  and  efficient  na- 
tional Government  is  manifestly  the  essential 
prerequisite  for  the  attainment  of  all  these  quite 
legitimate  and  commendable  purposes. 

At  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  the  Chinese 
delegates  formulated  their  desires  in  the  fol- 
lowing seven  important  particulars  : — 

1.  Spheres  of  inflioence  and  special  interests. 
“The  Powers  are  to  declare  that  they  neither 
possess  nor  claim”  any  of  these,  and  “are 
ready  to  revise  all  treaties,  agreements,  notes 
and  contracts  establishing  such.” 

2.  Troops  and  police.  “All  foreign  troops 
and  police  on  Chinese  soil  to  be  immediately 
withdrawn,”  especially  Legation  guards. 

3.  Foreign  post-offices,  wireless  stations  and 
telegraphs.  “All  the  foreign  post-offices  to  be 
suppressed  before  January  1,  1921,  and  no  tel- 
egraphic installation  to  be  established  after- 
ward.” 

4.  Consular  jurisdiction.  On  China’s  prom- 
ulgation of  five  new  codes  by  end  of  1924,  and 
creating  new  tribunals,  extra-territorial  juris- 
diction is  to  be  abandoned. 

5.  Leased  territories.  “These  are  to  be  re- 
stored to  China.” 

6.  Foreign  municipal  Concessions.  “All  such 
are  to  be  restored  to  China  at  the  end  of  1924.” 

7.  Autonomy  in  respect  of  customs  tariff. 
“After  a time  to  be  agreed  upon  mutually, 
China  is  to  have  the  right  to  fix  her  own  tariffs.” 


4 


II*  Europe’s  Far  Eastern  Interests 

HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 

Each  of  the  expanding  nations  of  Europe  has  established  intimate  relations  with 
China.  These  relations  have  sometimes  been  due  to  treaties  honorably  secured. 
But  too  often  they  have  been  secured  as  the  result  of  aggressive  traders,  cunning 
diplomacy,  subtle  intrigue,  bribery,  threats  of  war  and  even  war.  The  rival  world 
policies  of  Russia,  Great  Britain  and  France  have  had  potent  influences  for  evil 
in  China. 

While  we  condemn  and  deplore  the  evdl,  no  fair-minded  student  can  fail  to  rec- 
ognize many  important  gains  that  have  come  to  China  through  her  growing  contacts 
with  the  Occident.  A new  China  is  being  born,  with  pain  and  much  confusion  no 
doubt,  but  who  can  doubt  the  ultimate  advantage  to  herself  and  to  all  the  world? 


British  aggressions  began  in  1823  when 
Burma  was  separated  from  China  and  by  war 
(1852)  and  continued  diplomacy  became  a full 
British  dependency  (in  1886).  British  traders, 
moreover,  insisted,  against  China’s  will,  in 
importing  opium  into  China  proper.  This  with 
several  other  co-operating  factors  led  to  two 
so-called  opium  wars  (1842  -and  1857)  by 
which  Britain  forced  her  trade  on  China,  se- 
cured Hongkong  as  a permanent  possession, 
provided  for  open  ports  and  foreign  settlements' 
at  several  “treaty  ports”  (now  numbering  some 
75  all  told),  established  “extra-territorial 
rights”  for  foreigners,  opened  the  Yangtse  river 
for  foreign  trade  and  secured  recognition  of  the 
“most  favored  nation”  principle.  It  is  com- 
monly though  mistakenly  believed  that  England 
forced  China  to  open  the  door  for  opium;  the 
fact  is  that  although  Chinese  destruction  of 
some  $12,000,000  of  opium  which  British  mer- 
chants had  brought  into  China  contrary  to 
Chinese  law,  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  first  war, 
when  the  treaty  of  1842  was  in  process  of  for- 
mulation the  British  representatives  told  those 
of  China,  that  they  might  themselves  write  the 
clauses  relating  to  the  trade  in  opium  and  that 
the  Chinese  representatives,  in  view  of  the  finan- 
cial profits  (personal  and  public)  thought  best 
to  permit  the  traffic  under  certain  regulations. 

France  united  with  Great  Britain  in  the  war 
of  1867-1860.  They  captured  Tientsin  and 
Pekin  and  burned  the  Chinese  Imperial  Sum- 
mer Palace.  After  repeated  conflicts,  by  1883 
France  made  Cochin  China  a part  of  her  Far 
Eastern  domain.  During  the  world  war  France 
forcibly  annexed  a half  square  mile  of  the  Chi- 
nese City  of  Tientsin  to  her  “settlement.” 


Russia  early  in  the  last  century  adopted  the 
policy  of  expansion  in  Asia.  After  her  defeat  by 
France  and  England  in  the  Crimea  (1854),  this 
policy  was  pushed  with  increased  vigor.  Step 
by  step  she  gained  Siberia.  The  entire  annexa- 
tion to  her  Empire  of  a million  square  miles 
north  of  the  Amur  River,  which  had  belonged  to 
China,  including  Vladivostok  and  six  hundred 
miles  of  coast  line,  was  accomplished  by  1860. 
But  even  this  did  not  bring  her  to  the  goal  of 
her  ambition,  a warm  water  outlet  for  her  in- 
ternational commerce.  Hence  followed  further 
aggressive  schemes  in  Manchuria  and  Korea 
which  finally  resulted  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  (1904-5). 

Japan,  successful  in  her  wars  with  China 
(1894-5)  and  Russia,  became  one  of  the  world 
powers.  She  annexed  Formosa  and  took  over 
from  Russia  her  leases  of  Port  Arthur  and 
South  Manchuria.  She  also  at  the  same  time 
gained  control  of  Korea  (formerly  under 
China).  This  country  she  annexed  in  1910. 

Spain  and  Portugal  and  Holland  have  had 
trading  posts  and  colonies  in  the  Far  East  for 
more  than  two  centuries.  Spain  lost  all  her 
holdings  in  the  Pacific  in  1898  first  by  the  war 
with  the  United  States  which  deprived  her  of 
the  Philippines,  and  then  by  sale  of  all  her 
Islands  to  Germany.  Portugal  took  (1557)  and 
still  possesses  only  Macao,  an  Island  and  a port 
near  Hongkong,  while  Holland  contented  her- 
self with  important  Islands  of  the  Malay  Archi- 
pelago, having  an  area  of  some  600,000  square 
miles. 

The  United  States,  by  her  war  with  Spain 
(1898-9),  came  into  possession  of  the  Philippine 
Islands,  for  which  nevertheless  she  paid  $20,- 
000,000  to  Spain  as  a consolation. 


5 


THE  SCRAMBLE  FOR  SPECIAL 
RIGHTS 

The  China-Japan  War  (1894-5)  disclosed 
the  military  impotence  of  China.  European 
partition  of  Africa  was  just  then  completed. 
Europe’s  big  business  and  imperialistic  politics 
saw  the  great  opening  in  China.  Then  began 
a fresh  assault  upon  China,  each  European  na- 
tion desiring  to  gain  as  large  a portion  as  pos- 
sible of  the  “luscious  melon”  that  was  waiting 
for  partition  among  the  powers. 

The  rival  nations  watched  with  jealousy  each 
others’  steps.  The  prime  movers  in  the  drama 
of  China’s  pitiful  collapse  were  Russia  and  Ger- 
many, followed  soon  by  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Japan. 

The  first  step  was  taken  jointly  by  Russia, 
Germany  and  France,  apparently  at  the  invita- 
tion of  China’s  most  illustrious  diplomat,  Li 
Hung  Chang.  They  sent  an  ultimatum  (1895) 
to  Japan  to  restore  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liao- 
tung Peninsula  to  China  which  she  had  ceded  to 
Japan  by  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki.  The 
real  purpose  of  that  act,  however,  as  disclosed 
by  later  events,  was  to  prevent  Japan  from 
having  any  share  in  the  big  “melon,”  and  to 
clear  out  of  the  way  both  geographically  and 
metaphorically  a dangerous  competitor. 

Germany  took  the  next  step  by  seizing  Kiao- 
chow  (1897)  and  forcing  upon  China  a treaty 
granting  to  Germany  private  rights  to  build 
railways  and  open  mines  in  Shantung.  This 
was  the  beginning  of  “special  interests”  and 
“rights”  and  “spheres  of  influence.”  That 
treaty  (1898)  was  a monument  to  subtle  and 
far-reaching  diplomacy.  China  made  many 
pledges,  among  them  one  to  pay  Germany  for 
all  her  investments  and  to  give  her  some  other 
more  desirable  place  in  China,  if  for  any  rea- 
son Germany  should  hand  back  Kiaochow  and 
lier  rights  in  Shantung.  Few  Americans  under- 
stand the  part  this  provision  has  played  in 
recent  history. 

Russia  promptly  occupied  (1898)  and  then 
leased  Port  Arthur  for  twenty-five  years  and 
secured  special  railroad  and  mining  rights 
(some  of  them  secret)  in  Manchuria  (400,000 
sq.  miles)  and  Mongolia  (1,300,000  sq.  miles). 
Her  great  Trans-Siberian  railway  was  rushed 
to  completion  to  Vladivostok,  to  Port  Arthur, 
to  Dalny  and  to  Newchang  and  a great  com- 
mercial city  was  built  at  Dalny  (Japanese 
Dairen).  Thus  did  Russia  at  last  secure  her 
dreams  of  more  than  a century  to  gain  unre- 
strained access  to  an  ice-free  port. 


Great  Britain,  seeing  what  huge  slices  of  the 
melon  had  been  secured  by  Germany  and  Russia, 
and  realizing  that  Russia  would  soon  dominate 
the  government  of  China  and  threaten  her  In- 
dian Empire,  unless  duly  checked,  secured 
(1898)  from  China  without  violence  and  only 
by  diplomacy,  a naval  base,  Weihaiwei,  between 
Kiaochow  and  Port  Arthur ; she  also  enlarged 
her  controlled  area  opposite  Hongkong  (Kow- 
loon) and  got  China  to  recognize  the  great 
central  region  through  which  China’s  largest 
navigable  river  flows,  the  Yangtse  basin,  as  a 
British  “sphere  of  influence,”  some  260,000 
square  miles  of  territory.  No  private  conces- 
sions in  that  region  should  be  made  by  Peking 
to  any  but  Britishers. 

France,  seeing  how  rapidly  the  other  nations 
were  getting  their  big  portions  of  the  “melon,” 
applied  for  and  secured  (1898)  an  important 
naval  base,  the  bay  of  Kwanchow,  in  south 
China,  not  far  from  Macao,  and  also  acknowl- 
edgment by  China  of  a large  section  of  south 
China  as  her  special  “sphere  of  influence”  with 
railroad  and  mining  rights. 

Italy,  seeing  what  others  were  getting,  entered 
a demand  for  something  too — but  China  dared 
to  say  no ! 

THE  “OPEN  DOOR”  PROPOSAL 

The  United  States  saw  that  unless  something 
effective  was  done,  China  would  soon  be  com- 
pletely divided  up  among  the  “powers,”  and 
her  treaty  rights  of  trade  on  the  basis  of  the 
“most  favored  nation”  would  amount  to  noth- 
ing. This  led  to  the  famous  proposition  by 
Secretary  Hay  (1899)  to  all  the  powers  ask- 
ing them  to  agree  to  maintain  the  “integrity 
of  the  Chinese  Empire”  and  to  practice  the 
principle  of  the  “open  door”  for  the  trade  of 
all,  even  within  the  special  “spheres  of  influ- 
ence.” His  proposal  did  not  seek  to  annul  those 
“spheres,”  nor  to  secure  any  special  opportu- 
nity for  American  traders,  but  only  to  prevent 
the  further  closing  of  the  doors  against  Ameri- 
can trade,  by  asking  equality  of  trade  oppor- 
tunity for  all.  All  the  nations  agreed  to  these 
proposals. 

This  “open  door”  policy  has  been  popularly 
misunderstood  as  including  equal  opportunity 
for  all  kinds  of  financial  investment  in  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  China.  The  policy  itself 
has  been  reaffirmed  in  many  treaties  and  inter- 
national “understandings,”  such  as  the  “Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance”  (first  made  in  1902  and 
twice  renewed  with  important  modifications) 
and  the  Lansing-Ishii  “Understanding”  (1917). 


6 


In  its  original  form  and  meaning,  however,  it  is 
no  longer  pertinent  or  adequate. 

The  “open  door”  policy  and  the  principle  of 
the  “spheres  of  influence”  have  been  given  a new 
slant — even  an  important  modification,  by  the 
communication  recently  sent  to  the  Chinese 
Minister  by  Secretary  Hughes. 

“The  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  never  associated  itself  with 
any  arrangement  which  sought  to  estab- 
lish any  special  rights  or  privileges  in 
China  which  would  abridge  the  rights  of 
the  subjects  or  citizens  of  other  friendly 
States;  and  I am  happy  to  assure  you 
that  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  Govern- 
ment neither  to  participate  nor  to  ac- 
quiesce in  any  arrangement  which  might 
purport  to  establish  in  favor  of  foreign 
interests  any  superiority  of  rights  with 
respect  to  commercial  or  economic  de- 
velopment in  designated  regions  of  the 
territories  of  China,  or  which  might  seek 
to  create  any  such  monopoly  or  prefer- 
ence as  would  exclude  other  nationals 
from  undertaking  any  legitimate  trade 
or  industry,  or  from  participating  with 
the  Chinese  Government  in  any  category 
of  public  enterprise.” 

This  important  declaration  of  our  Govern- 
ment would  seem  to  annul  the  Lansing-Ishii 
Agi'eement,  certainly  as  interpreted  by  many. 

THE  BOXER  UPRISING  , 

The  repeated  and  rapid  aggression  of  for- 
eigners brought  on  resentment  and  opposition 
among  the  Chinese  people.  This  culminated  in 
the  effort  of  the  “Boxers”'  (1900)  to  drive  all 
foreigners  out  of  the  country.  Over  250  for- 
eigners were  killed.  But  it  was  a vain  attempt. 
It  was  too  late  in  history,  too  ignorant  of  the 
forces  it  was  opposing  and  too  unorganized 
from  a military  standpoint.  The  “Powers” 
imposed  on  China  the  “Boxer  Indemnity,” 
(£67,500,000,  approximately  $337,500,000) 
payable  in  installments  for  thirty-nine  years, 
with  4 per  cent  interest.  This  helped  to  bring 
China  into  the  clutches  of  European  bankers, 
who  made  heavy  loans  to  China,  secured  by 
various  guarantees. 

This  experience  revealed,  however,  to  the 
“Powers”  that  the  “melon”  could  not  be  so  eas- 
ily sliced  up  and  partitioned  as  they  had  sup- 
posed, and  led,  during  the  fifteen  years  that 
followed,  to  a more  cautious  procedure  in  their 

* So  named  because  of  certain  boxer-like  gestures  which  were 
supposed  to  have  magic  power  against  Occidental  bullets  and 
bayonets. 


dealings  with  China,  with  the  Chinese,  and  with 
one  another.  The  rival  interests  of  Russia, 
Great  Britain,  Germany  and  France  began  to 
make  terms  with  each  other  to  their  common 
benefit  and  also  to  that  of  China.  They  saw 
the  impossible  vastness  of  the  task  of  ruling 
China  against  her  will. 

But  a new  factor  entered  the  tangle.  Rus- 
sia, not  satisfied  with  what  she  already  pos- 
sessed, proceeded  to  acquire  Korea  and  especial- 
ly her  two  principal  ports  for  additional  naval 
bases. 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  (1904-5) 

Japan  had  been  watching  with  dismay  Euro- 
pean aggressions  in  Asia.  For  European  dom- 
ination meant  exclusive  rights  for  occidentals 
and  diminishing  opportunity  for  Japan.  They 
were  hedging  her  in  with  an  iron  wall.  Her 
part  in  putting  down  the  Boxer  Uprising 
showed  her  how  excellent  was  her  military  equip- 
ment and  morale.  Russia’s  continued  course 
in  Manchuria  and  especially  in  Korea,  if  suc- 
cessful, meant,  as  they  all  well  saw,  the  throt- 
tling of  Japan.  This  was  the  real  cause  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  Japan’s  success  hurled 
Russia  back  to  her  ice-bound  ports,  restored 
Port  Arthur  to  Japan  and  secured  for  her  the 
South  Manchuria  railway  and  all  Russia’s 
rights  in  that  part  of  China  (about  150,000 
sq.  miles).  Thus  Japan  became  one  of  the 
powerful  predatory  powers,  reaping  benefits 
from  policies  of  militaristic  imperialism. 

Her  success  in  fighting  Russia  was  largely 
due  to  British  backing  by  means  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  (1902).  By  this  Alliance 
Great  Britain  secured  powerful  help  in  check- 
ing Russian  menace  to  her  Indian  Empire.  The 
Alliance  prevented  Germany  from  coming  to 
the  support  of  the  tottering  Russian  Armies. 
Germany  was  not  ready  in  1905  for  conflict 
with  Great  Britain.  After  her  war  with  Russia, 
Japan  began  to  press  her  “special”  rights  in 
the  province  of  Fukien,  because  it  lies  just 
across  the  Channel  from  Formosa. 

THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  MANCHU 
DYNASTY 

Japan’s  victory  over  Russia  gave  a mighty 
impulse  to  the  modernizing  movement  in  China. 
Fear  of  the  foreigner  led  to  the  popular  de- 
mand for  their  expulsion  or  at  least  for  recov- 
ery from  them  of  the  rights,  powers  and  con- 
cessions wrung  from  helpless  or  corrupt  officials. 
The  rulers  themselves  also  saw  that  China  must 
follow  in  Japan’s  footsteps  and  must  develop 


t 


her  own  resources  and  power,  if  she  was  to  hold 
her  own  against  the  foreigner.  Japan  had 
shown  how  it  could  be  done.  This  insight  of 
China’s  principal  leaders  resulted  in  the  official 
adoption  of  occidental  education  (1905),  the 
beginning  of  w'estern  military  methods  and  the 
demand  for  an  occidentalized  government.  Her 
achievements,  however,  along  all  these  lines, 
leave  much  to  be  desired. 

The  centuries-old  Manchu  Dynasty  was  over- 
thrown (1911)  and  for  ten  years  China  has 
been  in  the  throes  of  revolution  after  revolu- 
tion and  of  civil  war,  in  efforts  to  establish  a 
Democracy. 

THE  CHRISTIAN  MOVEMENT  IN 
CHINA 

During  these  succeeding  decades  of  increas- 
ing political  and  international  turmoil  a factor 
was  at  \vork  that  long  received  scant  recogni- 
tion whether  from  foreigners  or  from  Chinese. 
Modern  Christian  Missions  began  in  China  with 
the  arrival  of  Robert  Morrison  in  1807.  A 
generation  passed  wdth  little  apparent  success. 
From  1842,  however,  and  onward  till  1900 
Christianity  slowly  gathered  headway,  although 
almost  entirely  among  illiterate  Chinese.  When 
the  “Boxers”  attempted  (1900)  to  drive  out 
all  foreigners  and  exterminate  Christianitv, 
some  ten  thousand  Chinese  Christians  lost  their 
lives ; but  it  was  then  discovered  that  Chris- 
tianity had  taken  so  firm  a hold  in  China  that 
its  extermination  was  practically  impossible. 
The  persecution  but  tested  the  faith  and  deep- 
ened the  belief  of  scores  of  thousands.  Again 
it  Avas  proved  that  the  blood  of  martyrs  is  the 
seed  of  the  church. 

From  1900  and  onward  the  Christian  move- 
ment developed  steadily  and  rapidly.  Especial- 
ly since  the  doAvnfall  of  the  monarchy  and  the 
Avide  introduction  of  occidental  education, 
Christianity  has  been  Avelcomed  by  scholars  and 
political  leaders  to  a degree  that  is  a constant 
amazement.  Many  of  the  leaders  of  the  Re- 
public are  professed  Christians,  Avdiile  few'  of 
them  have  not  in  one  Avay  or  another  come  un- 
der its  influence.  Many  of  China’s  outstanding 
statesmen  today  are  looking  to  Christianity  as 
the  one  hope  for  the  future  of  the  nation. 

During  the  past  decade  foreign  missionaries 
have  exceeded  5,000  in  number,  while  Chinese 
pastors  and  other  workers  have  exceeded  20,- 
000.  The  Christian  community  in  China  now' 
exceeds  one  million. 

The  by-products  of  the  Christian  movement 
in  China  are  many  and  great.  Shallow'  observ- 
ers are  apt  to  prize  these  more  highly  than  the 


direct  AV'ork — admiring  the  fruits  but  caring 
little  for  the  roots.  Among  them  may  be 
mentioned  China’s  rapidly  developing  though 
still  very  imperfect  occidental  school  system 
and  many  higher  institutions  of  learning;  nu- 
merous hospitals  Avith  the  croAvning  Medical  In- 
stitute recently  established  by  the  Rockefeller 
Foundation;  the  return  by  America  of  the 
“Boxer  Indemnity”  by  Avhich  several  thousand 
Chinese  students  have  already  been  enabled  to 
study  in  America ; repeated  flood  and  famine 
relief  benevolences ; and  above  all  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  personal  friendships  knit  together  be- 
tAveen  Chinese  and  Christians  of  other  lands, 
by  Avhich  Chinese  are  learning  really  to  under- 
stand and  believe  in  foreigners  and  foreigners 
to  understand  and  really  believe  in  Chinese. 
The  hope  of  bridging  the  great  chasm  between 
East  and  West,  betAveen  white  and  yellow,  lies 
in  these  personal  friendships,  and  this  mutual 
confidence. 

THE  WORLD  WAR  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Confusion  in  China  became  still  AA'orse  with 
the  World  War  (1914).  Both  England  and 
Japan  were  glad  to  eliminate  Germany  from 
the  Far  East.  This  they  did  in  a six  weeks’ 
campaign  ( September-November,  1914).  They 
captured  KiaochoAV.  Japan  took  over  the  Shan- 
tung railway  and  enforced  a control  on  certain 
sections  of  the  province  more  complete  and 
drastic  than  Germany  had  ever  attempted. 

From  the  standpoint  of  power,  Japan  be- 
came the  predominant  nation  of  the  Far  East 
and  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Japan  saw  her  oppor- 
tunity to  play  a masterful  role  in  China,  be- 
cause of  the  turmoil,  preoccupation  and  inevi- 
table post-war  weakness  of  Europe.  She  im- 
posed her  will  on  China  by  means  of  many  “de- 
mands” put  through  by  an  ultimatum.  China 
Avas  ill-prepared  for  the  unequal  game,  and 
apparently  had  no  international  friends. 
Japan  from  being  a teacher  and  a model  to  be 
folloAA'ed  by  China,  began  to  be  feared  and  hated 
as  the  most  ruthless  and  dangerous  of  the  for- 
eign aggressors. 

In  the  vicissitudes  of  the  great  European  war, 
Russian  autocracy  completely  vanished.  In  an- 
ticipation of  the  Allied  victory,  Japan  secured 
(early  in  1917)  assurances  from  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Italy  that  they  would  support  her 
claims  at  the  Peace  Conference  to  all  German 
rights  in  Shantung  and  in  the  Pacific. 

Then  America  entered  the  war  (April,  1917) 
and  also,  reluctantly,  China  ( September, 
1917).  While  the  Allies  and  America  were 
completely  absorbed  in  the  great  struggle, 


8 


Japan  was  busy  consolidating  her  position  and 
her  interests  in  the  Far  East.  Her  tradesmen 
and  her  merchant  ships  displaced  all  others.  By 
large  loans  to  China,  made  with  corrupt  Chi- 
nese officials,  Japan  secured  a powerful  grip  on 
China’s  internal  administration  and  natural  re- 
sources. By  her  possession  of  Kiaochow  and 
exclusive  control  of  the  customs  and  post-office 
of  Shantung,  Japanese  adventurers  were  able 
to  flood  and  debauch  large  sections  wuth  opium 
and  vice.  By  her  military  treaties  with  China’s 
corrupt  generals  and  viceroys,  whether  inten- 
tionally or  not,  she  fostered  the  political  tur- 
moil in  China.  Because  of  these  various  meth- 
ods of  aggression,  Japan  has  aroused  against 
herself  the  suspicions  and  fear  of  most  patriotic 
Chinese  and  the  hostility  of  most  foreign  trad- 
ers in  China.  For  they  see  nothing  but  disaster 
and  defeat  ahead,  unless  in  some  way  Japan  can 
be  forced  or  led  to  play  the  international  game 
on  new  lines. 

The  collapse  of  Russia  and  the  presence  in 
Siberia  of  scores  of  thousands  of  Russia’s  pris- 
oners, German  and  others,  created  a new'  factor 
of  fear  in  the  Occident  and  led  to  the  Allied 
military  expeditions  to  Siberia  (1918).  Japan 
took  the  lead,  but  the  policies  of  Japan’s  Gen- 
eral Staff  and  the  character  of  diplomacy 
caused  serious  friction  between  American  and 
Japanese  troops  and  officers  in  Siberia.  The 
strong  anti-Japanese  feeling  that  now  pervades 
the  American  Legion  is  due  in  large  part  to  the 
experiences  of  the  American  army  in  Siberia 
during  those  months.  Although  in  1919  all 
other  forces  withdrew  from  Siberia,  Japanese 
troops  are  still  there,  a cause  of  much  doubt 
and  suspicion  in  the  Occident  and  deeply  re- 
sented by  Russian  residents. 

THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION 

The  industrial  nations  of  Europe  are  eager 
now  to  re-establish  full  relations  with  China  and 
to  recover  their  lost  commerce.  But  they  find 
the  Government  and  traders  of  Japan  entrench- 
ed and  in  their  way.  Japan  has  prospered 
greatly  during  the  world  war  through  her 
enormous  foreign  trade.  This  she  wdshes  to  re- 
tain. Patriotic  Chinese  indignantly  resent  the 
Japanese  grip  upon  their  land  and  especially 
on  the  province  of  Shantung.  They  fear  and 
hate  Japan.  The  Chinese  delegates  at  Paris 
repudiated  the  Shantung  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  as  unjust  and  illegal.  German v. 


they  insisted,  had  lost  all  rights  in  China,  can- 
celled by  Cliina’s  own  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany.  The  Allies  at  Paris,  therefore,  had 
no  right,  China  claims,  to  give  non-existing  so- 
called  German  rights  to  Japan  or  to  anybody. 
Japan  could  not  become  legal  heir  to  Germany’s 
rights  in  China  merely  by  seizing  Kiaochow  and 
the  railway.  Germany  herself  could  not,  with- 
out China’s  consent,  transfer  them  to  Japan. 
To  be  a legal  heir  to  those  rights  Japan  must 
herself  receive  them  from  China.  It  w'as  absurd, 
therefore,  for  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  to  re- 
quire Germany  to  hand  over  her  rights  in  Shan- 
tung to  Japan,  and  for  Japan  to  think  that  she 
can  now  return  them  to  China.  Consultation 
with  China  and  her  consent  to  arrangements 
about  Shantung  were  essential  before  the  Peace 
Conference  had  any  right  to  deal  witli  that 
question. 

Since  the  signing  of  the  Versailles  Treaty 
Japan  has  proposed  three  times  to  confer  with 
China  regarding  the  restoration  of  Kiaochow, 
but  China  has  steadily  refused  to  enter  such  a 
conference,  contending  that  there  is  nothing  to 
confer  about.  All  Japan  has  to  do,  China 
maintains,  is  to  restore  stolen  goods.  Euro- 
peans, no  less  than  Chinese,  are  eager  for  Japan 
to  get  out  and  to  keep  out  forever. 

BRITISH  DOMINATION  IN  TIBET 

In  spite  of  her  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war.  Great  Britain  did  not  overlook  affairs  in 
the  Far  East,  especially  as  they  might  affect 
her  Indian  Empire. 

Since  the  seventeenth  century,  Tibet  has 
been  under  the  suzerainty  of  China — like  Man- 
churia, Mongolia,  Anam  and  Burma.  Begin- 
ning in  1888  troubles  arose  betw'een  China  and 
Great  Britain  in  regard  to  Tibet.  Treaties  and 
conventions  w'ere  repeatedly  made.  In  1906 
Great  Britain  acknowledged  China’s  suzerainty 
over  Tibet  but  denied  her  sovereignty.  In  1914 
fresh  difficulties  developed,  which  grew'  worse, 
culminating  in  1917,  when  a number  of  “de- 
mands” were  made  on  China.  The  author  of 
“Peking  Dust,”  writing  about  these  “demands,” 
says : “Over  here  it  is  not  customary  to  think 
or  speak  of  anything  but  Japanese  aggression. 
Japan,  you  see,  offers  the  only  stumbling  block 
to  the  complete  domination  of  the  Orient  by 
Europe.  But  for  Japan,  China  might  possibly 
become  another  India.” 


9 


Ill*  Japan’s  Problems 

JAPAN’S  experiences  with  Europeans  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  in 
spite  of  early  friendly  reception,  led  in  time  to  fear  and  later  to  their  expulsion. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  exterminate  Christianity.  From  about  1620  until  1854 
Japan  would  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  Westerners.  But  in  this  year  (1854) 
through  fear  of  complete  disaster  she  made  a treaty  with  the  United  States  and  soon 
after  with  the  Governments  of  Europe,  and  in  1868  she  definitely  decided  to  adjust 
her  life  to  that  of  the  world  that  could  no  longer  be  resisted. 

She  set  aside  her  feudal  system  (1871),  sent  her  young  men  to  study  in  every 
western  land,  imported  many  foreign  teachers  and  gradually  adopted  occidental 
methods  in  every  department  of  her  life.  Not  only  did  she  establish  an  army  and 
navy  on  western  patterns,  German  and  British,  but  popular  schools  on  American 
models,  universities  on  German,  and  railroads  and  factories,  dock-yards  and  ship- 
ping companies. 


In  1871,  after  more  than  250  years  of  abso- 
lute opposition  to  Christianity,  Japan  adopted 
the  principle  of  religious  liberty,  welcomed 
missionary  and  foreign  teachers  and  permitted 
her  people  to  drink  freely  of  western  culture 
and  religion.  From  extraordinary  anti-Chris- 
tian fear  and  anti-foreign  prejudice,  in  a very 
few  years  her  people  began  to  admire  and  to 
learn  from  the  West.  The  lives  of  missionaries 
(now  exceeding  one  thousand)  living  in  all  parts 
of  Japan  from  which  the  ordinary  foreigner 
was  excluded  until  1899,  convinced  the  masses 
of  the  people  that  foreigners  were  not  “demons” 
but  were  men  and  women,  worthy  of  confidence 
and  friendship.  The  result  of  this  last  half 
century  is  a new  Japan,  educated,  intelligent, 
ambitious,  sophisticated  and  determined  to  be, 
and  to  be  recognized  as  being  one  of  the  world’s 
great  nations  with  corresponding  rights. 
Japan  has  become  a great  industrial  and  trad- 
ing nation  and  thanks  to  her  adoption  of  occi- 
dental medicine  and  hygiene,  her  population, 
already  heavy,  has  doubled  in  sixty  years  (now 
about  55,000,000  in  Japan  proper).  She  is 
increasingly  dependent  for  food  and  for  raw 
material  on  her  international  trade.  She  now 
needs  extensive  markets  for  her  industrial  prod- 
ucts. There  remains  in  Japan  proper  scant 
room  for  her  increasing  millions.  Her  natural 
resources  in  coal  and  iron,  the  essential  founda- 
tions of  modern  industrial  nations,  are  very 
slight. 

Japanese  leaders  claim  that  the  nation  is 
doomed  unless  adequate  supplies  of  food  and 
raw  materials  are  assured  and  also  markets  for 
her  products.  Her  mountainous  islands  afford 
only  limited  areas  for  cultivation.  It  has  been 


estimated  that  for  every  square  mile  of  arable 
land  there  are  2,688  people  to  feed,  more  than 
four  to  an  acre.  The  population  is  growing 
by  500,000  to  700,000  annually.  These  are 
the  two  physical  facts — population  and  food — 
that  make  Japan’s  problem  a world  problem. 

Japan’s  problem  is  particularly  difficult  be- 
cause relief  by  emigration  is  not  practicable. 
Japanese  laborers  cannot  compete  with  Chinese, 
Koreans  or  Manchurians.  They  will  not  go  to 
Formosa  because  it  is  too  hot,  or  to  Manchuria 
or  Siberia  because  it  is  too  cold.  The  countries 
to  which  they  would  like  to  go  are  closed  to 
them — ^Canada,  the  United  States,  Mexico,  Aus- 
tralia and  New  Zealand.  The  possibilities  of 
South  America  are  still  uncertain  but  not 
hopeful. 

JAPAN’S  RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA 

Japanese  statesmen  have  long  held  that  China 
and  Japan  form  a single  economic  unit,  even 
as  the  peoples  also  belong  to  essentially  tbe 
same  race.  They  begin  to  see  that  Japan’s  per- 
manent welfare  and  existence,  even,  are  indis- 
solubly bound  up  with  that  of  China.  This  is 
why  they  have  watched  with  anxious  alarm 
China’s  impotent  diplomacy  by  which  her  re- 
sources have  been  continuously  and  too  often 
unscrupulously  bartered  away  to  Europeans. 
Japan  felt  that  in  fighting  Russia  she  saved  not 
only  herself  but  also  all  of  East  Asia  from 
immediate  European  domination. 

When,  therefore,  the  great  war  came,  because 
of  the  extraordinary  opportunity  it  gave  her, 
Japan  proceeded  so  to  adjust  her  relations  with 
China  that  she  herself  might  have  the  lead  and 


10 


that  the  fear  of  Europe  would  be  pei'manently 
removed  from  the  Far  East.  Her  procedure, 
however,  was  so  tactless,  selfish  and  “militar- 
istic,” that  she  offended  China,  whom  she  should 
have  befriended.  China  has  now  begun  to  fear 
and  hate  Japan,  apparently  worse  than  any 
other  foreign  people.  The  anti-Japanese  boy- 
cott initiated  by  Chinese  students  has  disclosed 
to  the  Japanese  their  frightful  mistake.  Pro- 
gressive Japanese  leaders  now  begin  to  see  that 
militarism  cannot  secure  for  them  what  they 
want  and  must  have  in  China — permanent,  un- 
interrupted trade. 

But  Japanese  leaders  also  fear  European  and 
American  influence  in  China — to  the  detriment 
of  their  trade,  their  access  to  raw  materials 
and  their  market.  These  things  she  must  have 
or  perish,  yet  she  sees  European  and  American 
influences  of  enormous  financial  and  naval  pow- 
er closing  down  upon  her,  threatening  to  dom- 
inate the  regions  whence  for  ages  to  come  she 
must  get  her  food,  her  iron,  her  coal  and  many 
other  essentials  for  her  industry,  and  where  she 
must  maintain  her  markets. 

THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION- 
JAPAN’S  VIEWPOINT 

Japan  feels  that  Germany  was  nothing  more 
than  a new  plundering  robber  in  the  Orient 
when  she  seized  Kiaochow  and  imposed  upon 
China  that  cunning  treaty  of  1898.  When  the 
chance,  therefore,  came  in  1914  to  drive  her 
out  of  the  Ear  East  and  to  retaliate  for  the 
humiliation  she  (Japan)  had  received  at  the 
hands  of  Russia,  Germany  and  France  in  1895, 
she  was  only  too  glad  to  do  it. 

Although  Japan  stated  in  her  ultimatum  to 
Germany  (1914)  that  she  would  give  Kiaochow 
back  to  China,  her  purposes  apparently  vacil- 
lated for  a while.  She  soon  saw  that  she  could 
not  give  it  back  until  the  end  of  the  war,  be- 
cause of  that  subtle  article  of  the  German- 
Chinese  treaty  about  China’s  obligations  in  case 
Germany  returned  it.  And  in  any  case  the  per- 
manent settlement  of  captured  German  terri- 
tory could  not  be  properly  made  until  the  Allies 
should  jointly  agree  to  the  common  terms  and 
Germany  should  give  her  assent.  In  those  in- 
tervening years  Japan  thought  wise  to  make 
certain  her  gains  of  the  great  war  and  to  stake 
out  large  claims  for  the  future.  She  wanted 
definite  engagements  with  China  by  which  the 
terms  of  the  final  disposal  of  German  rights 
would  be  certainly  hers.  Japan  also  wanted  to 
make  sure  that  when  returned  to  China,  China 
would  not  be  free  either  to  give  Kiaochow  back 
to  Germany  or  to  allow  any  other  country  to 


get  a foothold  there — a procedure  that  was 
easily  thinkable  in  view  of  what  had  happened 
to  Port  Arthur  after  Japan  returned  it  to 
China  in  1895. 

Hence  came  the  “twenty-one  demands,”  im- 
portant sections  of  which  were  finally  agreed  to 
by  China  though  under  threat  of  an  ultimatum. 
Japan  regards  herself  as  having  been  very  le- 
nient with  China,  for  she  permitted  these  negoti- 
ations to  drag  along  for  more  than  three 
months,  and  in  fact  she  accepted  many  changes 
suggested  by  China.  She  withdrew  for  the  time 
being  all  of  group  V,  the  most  objectionable 
proposals.  In  view  of  the  mutual  agreements 
that  had  been  reached  by  the  end  of  March  in 
regard  to  nearly  all  the  points,  it  is  often  asked 
why  Japan  issued  an  ultimatum.  The  answer 
given  by  Japan  is  that  Yuan  Shih  Kai  was  al- 
ways shifting,  agreeing  and  then  withdrawing 
his  agreements.  Another  statement  made  by 
important  Japanese  is  that  Yuan  Shih  Kai  him- 
self arranged  for  the  ultimatum,  for  he  feared 
a revolt  against  him  if  the  people  felt  that  he 
had  easily  yielded  to  Japan’s  mere  diplomatic 
demands.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  Japan 
included  nothing  in  the  terms  of  her  ultimatum 
that  the  Chinese  representatives  had  not  already 
agreed  to  in  their  prolonged  negotiations. 

Having  thus  by  treaty  with  China  secured 
recognition  of  her  succession  to  all  German 
rights  in  Kiaochow  and  Shantung,  and  having 
promised  to  return  all  sovereign  rights  to  China 
as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  war,  retaining 
all  the  economic  rights  and  having  confirmed 
her  claims  by  the  so-called  secret  treaties  of 
1917  with  Great  Britain  and  Italy  and  France, 
Japan  was  amazed  to  find  at  Paris  that  China 
was  virtually  repudiating  her  agreements,  main- 
taining that  her  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany  (in  1917)  had  annulled  all  German 
rights  in  Shantung  and  that  therefore  her 
(China’s)  treaty  of  May,  1915,  with  Japan  re- 
garding Shantung  was  null  and  void. 

Japan  has  steadily  declined  to  take  that  view. 
She  it  was,  she  insists,  who  drove  Germany  out. 
She  held  and  still  holds  those  properties.  China 
agreed  in  1915  to  such  possession.  If  they  go 
back  into  Chinese  hands,  it  will  be  because  she 
wrested  them  from  Germany  and  of  her  own 
free  will  restores  them  to  China. 

Japanese  contend  that  the  decisive  reason 
why  the  Versailles  Treaty  gave  all  German 
rights  in  Shantung  unconditionally  to  Japan 
was  because  the  Allies  doubted  whether  Germany 
would  actually  restore  to  China  all  the  rights 
which  her  treaty  of  1898  had  secured,  unless 
some  power  required  it.  China  herself  could 


11 


not  be  trusted  to  insist  on  German  fulfillment 
of  the  requirement.  Of  course,  the  Allies  were 
under  the  obligations  of  their  own  pledges  to 
Japan  of  1917.  The  Allies  were  also  eager  to 
liave  German  economic  competition  in  the  Far 
East  eliminated  just  so  far  as  possible. 

Japan  on  the  other  hand  wanted  both  China 
and  the  western  nations  to  know  that,  so  far 
as  she  could  enforce  it,  the  era  of  European 
domination  in  China  had  ended ; that  even  China 
herself  might  not  dispose  of  important  privi- 
leges and  territories  to  any  foreign  people, 
for  such  disposal  vitally  affects  Japan’s  own 
interests  in  the  decades  ahead,  and  perhaps  even 
her  very  existence. 

Japan  unanimously  and  insistently  maintains 
that  her  geographical  relations  to  and  economic 
dependence  on  the  continental  regions  of  East 
Asia  create  and  justify  her  in  demanding  in- 
ternational recognition  of  her  “special  inter- 
ests” and  her  inalienable  rights  in  regard  to 
the  doings  of  western  nations  in  that  area. 

As  for  Clffna’s  claims  that  Germany’s  rights 
in  Shantung  lapsed  back  to  her  when  she 
(China)  declared  war,  Japan  insists  that  those 
claims  are  nullified  by  the  fact  that  China  had 
already  by  the  treaty  of  Ma}',  1915,  made  full 
agreements  with  Japan  in  regard  to  them. 
Japan  does  not  admit  that  China’s  declaration 
of  war  had  any  effect  on  her  possession  of  the 
German  rights  under  consideration.  And  this 
view  seems  to  have  been  accepted  by  the  Su- 
preme Council  in  Paris  that  made  the  Versailles 
Treaty. 

Such  perhaps  are  the  chief  considerations 
that  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  studying 
Japan’s  viewpoint  regarding  the  Shantung 
question.  Because  of  Japan’s  methods  in  Shan- 
tung and  apparent  duplicity  in  announcing  to 
the  western  nations  the  nature  of  her  “twenty- 
one  demands,”  which  at  first  she  spoke  of  as 
“fourteen,”  America  lost  confidence  in  her 
straightforwardness  and  sincerity. 

JAPANESE  RIGHTS  IN  MANCHURIA 

When  Russia  acquired  Port  Arthur  and  the 
hinterland  in  1898,  it  was  on  a twenty-five  year 
lease.  Her  construction  of  railways  and  forti- 
fications, however,  indicated  plans  for  perpetual 
control.  When  Japan  recovered  Port  Arthur, 
by  the  terms  of  the  Portsmouth  treaty  (1905) 
she  secured  it  for  only  the  balance  of  the  Rus- 
sian lease,  that  is,  until  1923.  Japan,  how- 
ever, like  Russia,  had  no  expectations  of  re- 
storing Port  Arthur  to  China  at  the  end  of 
the  period.  When,  therefore,  in  1915  Japan 


presented  her  “twenty-one  demands”  and  later 
her  ultimatum,  she  included  an  extension  of  that 
lease  to  99  years  like  the  German  lease.  Japan 
also  secured  several  fresh  rights  for  Japanese 
residents  in  Manchuria  which  they  had  not  be- 
fore enjoyed.  Japan  is  therefore  today  very 
firmly  entrenched  in  Manchuria  with  civil  and 
economic  rights  which  place  her  above  every 
other  foreign  nationality  in  that  region. 

JAPAN’S  DESIRES  IN  REGARD  TO 
SIBERIA 

Japan’s  anxiety  about  Siberia  has  been  due 
not  only  to  her  desire  to  have  unhampered  eco- 
nomic opportunity  there  for  her  people — al- 
though no  considerable  Japanese  emigration  to 
Siberia  is  regarded  as  at  all  likely — but  also 
to  two  causes  for  fear ; first,  fear  of  the  de- 
structive doctrines  of  Bolshevism  which  she 
wishes  to  exclude  from  Japan;  and  second,  fear 
lest  Russia,  regaining  possession  of  Siberia,  may 
in  some  future  decade  return  to  the  policy  of 
getting  a port  free  from  ice  the  year  through — 
which  would  mean  another  war  with  Japan. 
Japan,  therefore,  prefers  to  see  established  in 
Siberia,  east  of  Lake  Baikal,  a Government 
quite  independent  of  Russia — a “buffer  state.” 
Japan  would  have  no  fear  of  such  a Govern- 
ment. Mutually  helpful  and  therefore  friendly 
relations  could  easily  be  established. 

Many  Americans  hold  that  Japan  desires  to 
annex  East  Siberia  to  her  own  dominions.  This 
would  seem  to  be  a mistake.  Japan  knows  full 
well  that  if  she  annexed  East  Siberia,  so  that 
her  western  frontier  would  be  Russia’s  eastern 
frontier,  friction  would  surely  develop  between 
the  two  countries  and  in  the  end  probably  war. 
A buffer  state  between  Japan  and  Russia  is, 
therefore,  Japan’s  manifest  need  and  desire. 

JAPAN’S  DOMINATION  IN  KOREA 

Japan  does  not  regard  Korea  as  any  part 
of  her  international  problem.  She  considers 
that  peninsula  to  be  indissolubly  a part  of  her 
Empire  even  as  England  regards  Ireland  to  be 
an  inseparable  part  of  her  Empire.  Japan 
would  resent  any  effort  to  introduce  the  “Kor- 
ean Question”  into  the  Washington  Conference 
as  indignantly  as  Great  Britain  would  resent 
the  raising  of  the  Irish  question.  A few  facts 
however  about  Korea  may  not  be  inappropriate. 

For  2,000  years  Japan  and  Korea  have  been 
neighbors.  The  culture  of  China  and  of  India 
first  blessed  Korea  and  then  passed  through 
Korea  to  Japan.  But  for  centuries,  Korean- 
Japanese  relations  have  not  been  pleasant.  In 


12 


1600  Japan  invaded  Korea  and  inflicted  untold 
damage.  From  1870  and  onward  China  and 
Japan  pushed  rival  claims  in  Korea,  for  her 
backwardness,  corruption  and  incompetence 
made  her  a problem  for  both  China  and  Japan. 
Matters  came  to  a head  in  1894!,  resulting  in 
the  Chino-Japan  war  for  which  each  party  was 
in  part  to  blame.  Japan’s  victory  established 
her  leadership.  She  assured  Korea  indepen- 
dence. This  was,  however,  misused.  By  1903  it 
became  clear  that  Korea  would  surely  become 
part  of  Russia’s  Oriental  Empire  unless  annex- 
ation by  Russia  were  forcibly  restrained.  This 
produced  the  Russo- Japan  War.  Even  then 
Japan,  though  victorious,  left  Korea  a large 
amount  of  autonomy.  Again  Korea  failed  to 
use  aright  her  opportunity,  resulting  in  Japan’s 
act  of  complete  annexation  (1910),  acquiesced 
in  by  all  the  powers  including  the  United  States 
under  President  Roosevelt. 

But  Japan’s  attempt  during  the  past  de- 
cade by  rough,  military  pressure  to  “assimi- 
late” the  Koreans  and  make  them  very  rapidly 
into  loyal  Japanese,  speaking  the  Japanese 
language  and  worshipping  the  Japanese  Em- 
peror, has  proved  a tragic  failure.  Although 
the  physical  development  of  Korea  has  been 
rapid  and  is  admitted  by  all  impartial  observers, 
the  rulers  have  alienated  the  Koreans  by  extra- 
ordinary cruelties  and  injustices.  Whep  in 
1919  simple-minded  Koreans  by  the  thousand 
assembled  to  shout  forth  their  patriotic  desire 
for  independence,  they  were  treated  by  Japan- 
ese soldiers  and  police  as  dangerous  revolution- 
aries. Japan’s  blind  and  foolish  militarism,  by 
torture  and  floggings  innumerable,  only  fanned 
the  fires  of  Korean  desire  for  complete  separa- 
tion from  an  alien  government  that  could  be 
so  inhuman. 

Critics  of  Japan,  however,  should  acknowl- 
edge that  liberal  Japanese  deplore  these  deeds 
as  truly  as  liberals  of  any  land.  The  Kara 
Cabinet  took  rather  prompt  steps  to  apply  a 
remedy.  The  military  Governor  General  was 
required  to  resign  and  in  his  place  a Civil  Gov- 
ernor was  appointed.  Many  reforms  have  been 
begun  and  some  progress  has  been  made  in  spite 
of  the  opposition  of  many  lower  officials  and  the 
implacable  attitude  of  ardent  Korean  patriots. 
Japanese  liberals  do  not  fail  to  condemn  the 
doings  of  their  militarists  in  Korea  and  many 
are  saying  that  Korea  should  at  least  be  given 
complete  autonomy  as  soon  as  possible. 


THE  YAP  CONTROVERSY 

Newspaper  writers  have  made  much  commo- 
tion over  this  tiny  island,  some  4*00  miles  west 
from  Guam.  It  was  bought  by  Germany  from 
Spain  in  1899  and  made  a center  for  her  cable 
lines,  of  which  one  went  to  Shanghai,  one  to 
Guam,  and  one  to  German  New  Guinea.  When 
Japan  drove  Germany  from  the  Pacific  in  1914! 
she  seized  this  along  with  many  of  Germany’s 
Islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean ; the  end  of  the 
cable  reaching  Shanghai  she  cut  and  connected 
with  Japan. 

The  sudden  interest  of  America  in  Yap  has 
been  due,  first  to  President  Wilson’s  plan  to 
“internationalize”  it,  a plan  not  accepted  by 
the  allies,  for  they  were  already  under  expressed 
obligations  to  give  it  to  Japan;  and  second,  to 
Secretary  Hughes’  use  of  it  as  the  fulcrum  for 
his  diplomatic  attack  on  the  proceedings  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  He  contended  that  neither 
the  allies  nor  the  League  of  Nations  could  dis- 
pose of  Germany’s  captured  territories  without 
the  consent  of  the  United  States  by  whose  aid 
Germany  had  been  overthrown,  and  that  there- 
fore Japan  could  not  claim  exclusive  possession 
of  Yap  nor  of  any  of  the  north  Pacific  Islands, 
even  though  given  to  her  by  the  allies. 

Japan’s  reply  to  these  contentions  has  been 
first  that  Britain,  France  and  Italy  agreed  in 
1917  before  America  entered  the  war,  that  Ger- 
many’s possessions  in  the  north  Pacific  should 
come  to  her  at  the  final  peace  settlement ; sec- 
ond that  there  is  no  record  of  President  Wil- 
son’s reservations  or  plans  regarding  Yap  in 
the  minutes  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference ; 
third,  that  all  mandated  areas  had  been  regu- 
larly assigned  in  the  regular  procedures, 
America  having  failed  to  attend  the  Commis- 
sion on  Mandates  though  invited;  the  fault 
therefore  is  with  America,  not  with  the  League ; 
fifth,  that  nevertheless  she  was  willing  to  make 
special  arrangements  with  the  United  States  in 
regard  to  the  Yap-Guam  cable,  and  sixth,  that 
it  would  be  better  and  much  cheaper  to  lay  a 
new  cable  from  Guam  to  Shanghai  and  give  it 
to  the  United  States  than  to  come  to  blows 
about  so  trivial  an  affair. 

According  to  newspaper  report  the  two  Gov- 
ernments have  I’eached  an  understanding,  but 
just  what  it  is  has  not  yet  been  authoritatively 
announced.  Its  formal  acceptance  has  appar- 
ently not  yet  taken  place. 


13 


How  trivial  the  issue  has  been  from  an  eco- 
nomic standpoint  is  evident  to  one  who  notes 
that  Yap  entirely  aside,  America  has  cable  con- 
nections through  HaAvaii  and  Guam  Avith  China 
via  the  Philippines  and  Avith  Japan  through  the 
Bonin  Islands. 

EMIGRATION  TO  THE  UNITED 
STATES 

Many  Americans  expect  Japan  to  raise  the 
question  of  Japanese  emigration  to  the  United 
States.  This  expectation  is  based  on  misappre- 
hension. For  Japan  regards  the  immigration 
question  betAveen  America  and  Japan  as  closed 
by  the  Gentlemen’s  Agreement  Avhich  has  been 
in  effective  operation  for  the  past  thirteen 
years. 

The  Japanese  Government  became  satisfied  in 
1907  that  further  immigration  of  Japanese 
laborers  into  the  United  States  Avould  jeopard- 
ize the  friendly  relations  of  the  tAAm  countries. 
She  preferred  that  such  immigration  should  be 
stopped  by  her  OAvn  action  rather  than  by  anti- 
Japanese  legislation  similar  to  that  enacted  and 
enforced  against  the  Chinese.  These  Avere  the 
considerations  that  led  to  the  famous  “Gentle- 
men’s Agreement.”  She  has  enforced  the  Agree- 
ment made  Avith  President  Roosevelt  so  faith- 
fully that  in  these  thirteen  years  some  17,000 
more  Japanese  males  have  left  the  United  States 
(including  HaAvaii)  than  have  entered.  Such 
increase  as  there  has  been,  about  18,000,  con- 
sists chiefly  of  Avomen  and  children  who  have 
come  to  join  their  husbands  and  parents. 

Japan  has  no  desire  to  abandon  the  Gentle- 
men’s Agreement.  Indeed  in  response  to  the 
earnest  suggestion  of  Japanese  in  California  the 
Japanese  Government  has  recently  voluntarily 
made  the  administration  of  the  Agreement  more 
rigid  by  refusing,  since  February,  1920,  to 
grant  passports  to  so-called  “picture  brides.” 

EQUALITY  OF  RACE  TREATMENT 

Although  Japan  aa'111  not  raise  the  question 
of  immigration  to  California — because,  as  just 
noted,  she  does  not  recognize  any  problem  in 
connection  Avith  it — it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  she  will  not  raise  the  question  of  anti- 
Japanese,  discriminatory  legislation  in  some  of 
the  western  states.  This  she  regards  as  a mat- 
ter that  affects  her  status  among  the  nations — 
for  it  affects  her  honor. 


Japan  does  not  ask  that  her  people  shall  be 
allowed  freely  to  migrate  hither;  but  she  does 
ask  that  those  who  are  here  shall  enjoy  the 
same  rights  and  receive  the  same  treatment  as 
are  given  to  foreigners  of  every  other  people 
residing  in  the  United  States.  She  insists  that 
such  equality  of  race  treatment  is  essential  to 
the  maintenance  of  right  and  friendly  relations 
betAveen  the  nations.  She  cannot  rest  content 
with  a treatment  that  implies  inferiority  of  her 
race  as  such.  It  affects  her  very  self-respect. 
This  is  a question  wholly  apart  from  all  eco- 
nomic questions.  It  concerns  national  ideals 
and  sense  of  honor  and  respect. 

AMERICA’S  NAVAL  MENACE 

A matter  that  has  begun  to  AAmrry  Japanese 
statesmen  and  people  alike  is  the  American  men- 
ace; seen  in  her  recent  sudden  enlargement  of 
her  navy  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  heavy  expend- 
itures for  the  four  naval  bases  on  the  Pacific 
Coast,  and  the  three  in  Hawaii,  Guam  and  the 
Philippines.  Japanese  writers  claim  that  since 
1898  the  United  States  has  expended  on  tAvo 
naval  bases  in  the  Philippines  $29,356,000 ; 
in  Guam  $18,922,000;  in  HaAvaii  $18,998,000, 
and  on  various  bases  on  the  Pacific  Coast 
and  in  Alaska  other  vast  sums,  bringing 
the  total  for  naval  bases  during  the  past 
tAventy  years,  the  most  of  it  since  1909,  up 
to  the  total  of  $214,459,000.  They  quote  at 
length  the  belligerent  utterances  of  outstanding 
Americans.  Admiral  Knight  is  quoted  as  say- 
ing that  “we  should  develop  Guam  as  a naval 
base  resembling  the  bases  at  Heligoland  and 
at  Malta,”  and  Senator  Lodge  as  saying  that 
“the  United  States  ought  to  notify  Japan  that 
she  is  prepared  to  spend  billions  of  dollars  to 
safeguard  her  interests  in  the  Pacific.” 

Why  does  America  send  her  biggest  and  heav- 
iest battleships  to  the  Pacific,  Japanese  are  be- 
ginning to  ask.?  Why  is  she  expending  scores 
of  millions  on  her  numerous  naval  bases.?  What 
is  the  significance  of  the  belligerent  utterances 
of  many  of  her  leading  politicians,  outstanding 
legislators  and  editors  of  important  newspa- 
pers.? Is  it  possible  that  America  is  planning  to 
attack  us.?  Is  her  big  fleet  intended  to  be  a 
make-weight  in  her  diplomacy.?  What  does  it 
mean.?  And  what  should  Japan  do.?  Such  are 
the  questions  that  thoughtful  Japanese  are  now 
asking — those  even  who  have  long  been  noted 
as  friends  of  America. 


14 


IV*  America’s  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Problem 


America  approaches  the  Problems  of  the  Pacifie  and  the  Far  East  from  an 
angle  quite  different  from  that  of  any  other  nation.  Our  intrinsic  interests  in 
China  are  much  less  than  theirs,  our  history  has  made  our  relations  with  China  much 
less  unpleasant,  our  vested  rights  are  much  less  complicated,  and  our  desires  are  very 
simple. 

America  has  just  now  a rather  sentimental  interest  in  China.  Our  people  always 
sympathize  with  the  “under  dog”  in  any  struggle,  and  China  certainly  seems  to  be 
in  that  position  at  present.  We  earnestly  desire  that  she  may  not  be  dismembered; 
that  her  sovereignty  which  has  been  more  or  less  abridged  by  the  aggressions  of  the 
nations  may  be  truly  preserved  and  that  her  territorial  and  administrative  integrity 
may  be  restored  and  permanently  maintained. 

American  traders  and  shippers  very  keenly  desire  the  complete  maintenance  of 
the  “open  door” — namely''  absolute  equality  of  trade  opportunities  for  all  alike — re- 
gardless of  “spheres  of  influence.” 

American  politicians  and  legislators  have  much  to  say  about  the  safety  of  our 
Island  possessions,  especially  the  Philippines,  Guam  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  which 
they  claim  are  menaced  by  Japan’s  ambitions  and  her  powerful  navy. 


While  we  want  full  and  free  opportunity  for 
Americans  in  the  Far  East  we  are  quite  de- 
termined that  there  shall  be  no  Asiatic  immigra- 
tion to  the  United  States.  Some  western  states 
have  by  legislation  restricted  the  equality  of 
economic  opportunity  of  Asiatics.  The  Fed- 
eral Government  allows  no  Asiatics  to  become 
American  citizens  by  naturalization. 

Americans  hardly  know  what  to  think  of 
Japan.  Many  are  convinced  that  she  has  vast 
militaristic  plans  for  the  domination  of  East 
Asia  and  the  creation  of  a Far  Eastern  military 
Empire ; that  she  now  has  practically  at  her 
feet  the  entire  natural  wealth  of  China  and  ere 
long  will  get  control  of  her  illimitable,  docile 
and  efficient  man  power.  With  these,  and  with 
her  mastery  of  occidental  science  and  technical 
skill,  Japan,  they  tell  us,  can  now  create  an 
empire  surpassing  in  power  anything  the  world 
has  ever  seen,  and  that  she  is  planning  to  con- 
tend with  the  white  race  for  world  domination. 

Those  who  picture  this  spectre  insist  that 
just  as  German  ambition  and  power  could  be 
overthrown  only  by  matching  power  with  su- 
perior power,  so  the  only  hope  for  the  world 
as  it  faces  this  rising  military  menace  is  to  over- 
throw it  before  it  becomes  too  strong.  America 
is  the  nation  on  whom  this  duty  rests.  We  must 
crush  Japan  or  she  will  crush  us  and  all  the 
West.  The  only  hope  of  success  lies  in  over- 
throwing her  before  she  masters  and  dominates 
China.  America’s  own  existence  as  a free  na- 
tion is  at  stake,  they  insist. 


This,  they  hold,  is  America’s  supreme  prob- 
lem of  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East.  The  true 
purpose  of  the  Washington  Conference,  they 
hold,  is  to  combine  the  nations  into  a single 
solid  body  to  draw  the  fangs  of  Japan  at  once. 

THE  SITUATION  AS  SEEN  BY  MANY 
AMERICANS 

Careful  students  of  Far  Eastern  problems 
entirely  reject  the  lurid  pictures  of  violent  anti- 
Japanese  agitators.  They  do,  however,  see  a 
most  difficult  situation  that  may  easily  culmi- 
nate in  a tragic  struggle.  The  factors  the}'  see 
are  such  as  these : 

1.  China  possesses  untold  natural  resources 
and  almost  unlimited  man  power  of  the  very 
highest  order  of  capacity  for  industrial  pro- 
duction. 

2.  When  China  starts  her  industrial  evolu- 
tion she  will  call  for  fabulous  amounts  of  ma- 
chinery and  capital  which  only  the  West  and 
especially  America  can  supply.  “Spheres  of  in- 
fluence” and  “closed  doors”  will  prevent  Ameri- 
can enjoyment  of  these  w'onderful  opportunities 
and  will  also  seriously  block  China’s  own  de- 
velopment. 

3.  Each  progressive  industrialized  nation 
naturally  desires  to  stake  off  as  large  a portion 
of  China  as  possible  as  its  special  preserve,  on 
the  theory  that  such  exclusive  rights  will  in- 
sure that  nation’s  share  in  China’s  development. 


15 


4.  Japan  is  especiall}^  entrenched  in  China, 
having  followed  during  the  last  few  years  the 
diplomatic  and  military  methods  of  Europe  in 
their  dealings  with  that  unhappy  land.  Japan 
has  now  raised  an  iron  ring  around  large  sec- 
tions and  has  a firm  military  grip. 

5.  Japan  not  unnaturally  looks  askance  at 
America’s  proposals  for  an  “open  door”  policy 
in  China  because  she  has  found  herself  rigidly 
excluded  from  opportunity  in  many  lands  and 
especially  in  America,  where  she  would  like  to 
share  in  economic  opportunity. 

6.  Japan  not  unnaturally  thinks  that  her 
only  hope  of  opportunity  for  raw  materials  and 
for  markets  in  China  during  the  long  future, 
depends  on  her  establishing  and  maintaining 
her  “Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine”  which  provides 
for  exclusive  economic  privileges.  American 
capital  and  American  enterprise  in  an  “open” 
China,  Japan  fears,  would  completely  monop- 
olize every  opening  and  completely  destroy  her 
opportunity  in  China.  Just  as  California  fears 
the  free  inflow  of  Japanese  labor,  so  Japan  fears 
the  free  inflow  of  American  capital  in  the  Far 
East.  For  in  the  opinion  of  Japan,  though 
America’s  imperialism  is  not  indeed  militaristic, 
being  economic  and  capitalistic,  it  is  none  the 
less  imperialistic  and  dangerous. 

7.  Siberia,  likewise,  is  a vast  country,  like 
the  American  northwest,  bound  to  develop  a 
large  population  in  the  near  future  and  bound 
to  demand  those  materials  which  America  is 
peculiarly  fitted  to  supply.  It  will  become  an 
incalculable  “economic  vacuum”  which  Japan 
cannot  supply.  She  appears  to  plan,  however, 
to  take  control  of  the  channels  of  approach,  to 
control  the  development  of  that  area  and  to 
take  a toll  on  all  materials  entering  that  region 
from  other  lands.  This,  Americans  believe,  will 
not  only  delay  the  development  of  Siberia,  but 
will  block  America  from  deriving  any  large  ad- 
vantage from  or  proper  share  in  its  develop- 
ment. 

8.  In  short,  an  incalculable  and  increasing 
“economic  vacuum”  is  certain  to  develop  in  the 
Far  East  in  the  near  future  in  proportion  as 
China  and  Siberia  develop.  This  economic  op- 
portunity Japan  desires  to  control  to  her  own 
advantage.  Other  countries,  however,  also 
eagerly  desire  to  share  in  it.  Japan  is  build- 
ing her  economic  barriers  around  these  countries 
which,  however,  the  economic  laws  of  demand 
and  supply  will  inevitably  sweep  away,  peace- 
fully if  not  resisted  by  military  force,  violently 
if  so  resisted. 


9.  Japanese  as  yet  fail  to  see  that  Japan’s  . 
own  real  advantage  in  the  long  run  is  to  have 
all  the  doors  to  East  Asia  thrown  open  to  all 
the  world.  A prosperous,  friendly  and  rapidly 
developing  China  and  Siberia,  aided  by  the  cap- 
ital and  the  brains  of  all  the  nations,  will  bring 
far  more  benefit  to  Japan  than  a China  and 
Siberia  closed  against  all  but  Japan  and  there- 
fore relatively  undeveloped  and  inevitably 
hostile  to  her. 

10.  Moreover,  a market  in  China  secured  by 
Japan  through  honest  and  straightforward 
competition  with  the  nations  of  Europe  will  be 
in  fact  far  more  worth-while  for  Japan  than  a 
market  preserved  from  competition  by  artificial 
military  power.  Japan’s  workmen  will  learn  to 
produce  first  class  goods  fitted  to  compete  with 
goods  from  the  West.  This  will  be  intrinsically 
and  in  the  end  better  for  Japan,  than  forever 
to  go  on  satisfied  with  the  manufacture  of  in- 
ferior products. 

IMPORTANT  CONSIDERATIONS 

Mighty  conflicting  interests  are,  thus,  mani- 
festly at  work  in  the  Far  East.  Their  recon- 
ciliation will  tax  the  skill  of  the  world’s  best 
statesmen.  But  this  reconciliation  is  vital. 
Unless  they  are  reconciled,  the  nations  are 
headed  sooner  or  later  for  another  frightful 
orgy  of  fire  and  bloodshed. 

America,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  now  hold 
the  keys  to  the  situation.  China  is  the  center 
of  the  possible  cyclone.  Japan  has  imperative 
vital  necessities.  China,  however,  stands  above 
all  others  in  her  right  to  be  freed  from  the 
dangers  coming  down  upon  her  through  the  ri- 
valries of  foreign  powers  for  economic  opportu- 
nities in  her  land  and  among  her  people. 

The  first  essential  step,  therefore,  in  finding 
a solution  is  a frank  conference  between  the 
interested  powers.  They  should  each  lay  upon 
the  conference  table  all  their  respective  claims, 
real  and  supposed.  This  will  disclose  how  far 
they  are  indeed  rivals ; whether  or  not  they  are 
conflicting  and  how  far  they  are  dangerous  to 
China’s  real  interests.  China  herself  should  be 
asked  to  state  how  much  of  these  claims  she 
recognizes. 

Plans  should  then  be  jointly  formed  for  such 
adjustments  and  common  agreements  in  regard 
to  policies  and  procedures  as  will  secure  for 
each  the  largest  and  fullest  opportunity  con- 
sistent with  like  opportunity  for  all,  always 
subject  to  China’s  own  best  interests.  In  this 
adjustment,  Japan’s  imperious  necessities 
should  receive  full  consideration,  and  adequate 
provision  should  be  made  for  their  satisfaction. 


16 


The  nations,  moreover,  should  not  forget 
that  in  these  modern  days,  war  between  great 
nations  cannot  be  short.  The  costs  of  war, 
however,  of  even  a short  war,  would  be  far 
greater  than  any  possible  profits  from  the 
trade  thus  secured  by  the  victor.  The  van- 
quished Avould  lose  his  trade  and  also  have  the 
costs  of  war  to  pay.  Economically  speaking, 
it  would  be  better  for  America  to  have  no  trade 
whatever  with  the  Far  East  than  to  have  it  at 
the  expense  of  a war  with  Japan,  or  even  at  the 
expense  of  the  billions  for  armaments,  which 
Senator  Lodge  declares  we  are  willing  to  pay. 

Americans  should  remember  that  if  Japan  is 
“feverishly  preparing  for  war  with  America”  it 
is  only  because  she  suspects  that  America  is 
preparing  “feverishly  for  war  with  Japan.” 

THE  LIBERAL  MOVEMENT  IN  JAPAN 

Americans  should,  however,  remember  that 
there  is  an  important  liberal  movement  in 
Japan.  Two  forces  are  at  grips,  the  militar- 
istic and  the  democratic. 

The  liberal  movement  that  was  so  powerful 
for  two  decades  (1870-1890)  gave  way  to  mil- 
itarism because  of  the  military  menace  in  the 
Ear  East  of  the  European  powers.  But  a new 
liberal  movement  is  now  powerfully  affecting 
the  entire  nation,  particularly  during  the  past 
three  years.  Militarism  is  manifestly  losing 
ground  rapidly.  The  catastrophy  to  Germany 
brought  on  by  her  militarism  is  proving  to  be 
a niost  salutary  object  lesson  to  Japan. 

The  assassination  of  Premier  Hara  (Nov.  4, 
1921)  was  the  work  of  an  unbalanced  youth 
and  had  apparently  no  political  significance. 
The  new  Premier,  Takahashi,  continues  the 
same  liberal  program  with  the  same  cabinet. 


The  surest  way  to  strengthen  Japan’s  mili- 
tarism is  to  present  a threatening  military  dan- 
ger to  Japan’s  life.  This  would  rally  the  entire 
nation  to  the  side  of  the  militarists.  The  be- 
ginning of  war  between  America  and  Japan 
would  be  the  signal  for  Japan’s  attempt  at 
military  domination  of  considerable  sections  of 
China.  This  she  would  feel  herself  forced  to 
undertake  in  order  to  secure  food  and  raw  ma- 
terial for  her  people,  who  would  devote  them- 
selves to  the  production  of  submarines,  battle- 
ships and  munitions.  A decisive  naval  battle 
between  the  two  countries,  however,  would  be 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  bring  about. 

The  writer  confidently  believes  that  the  true 
policy  for  America  in  dealing  with  the  prob- 
lems of  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East  is  the  out- 
spoken adoption  of  an  attitude  of  friendship, 
trust  and  good-will,  absolutely  free  from  any 
taint  of  militarism  or  navalism.  A militaristic 
effort  by  America  to  protect  China  and  at  the 
same  time  establish  our  own  economic  oppor- 
tunities and  rights  would  have  disastrous  re- 
sults. Only  the  growth  of  liberalism  in  Japan 
can  overthrow  Japanese  militarism.  Japanese 
militarism  will  vanish  when  Japan  sees  that  she 
faces  no  military  menace  and  that,  therefore, 
there  is  no  ground  for  heavy  military  or  naval 
expenditures. 

China  has  begun  to  discover  how  to  protect 
herself  from  Japan’s  militarism,  namely  by  the 
economic  boycott.  Persistent  refusal  by  scores 
of  millions  of  Chinese  to  buy  anything  made  in 
Japan  so  long  as  Japan  plays  the  part  of  the 
bully  in  China,  will  ultimately  and  inevitably 
induce  the  overthrow  of  militarism  in  Japan.  It 
is  already  having  that  tendency. 


A Summary  Review 

^’T^HE  Far  Eastern  Problem  consists  of  three  principal  elements. 

1.  China  and  her  stabilization. 

2.  Japan  with  her  necessities  and  policies. 

3.  Occidental  rivalry  for  commercial  and  capitalistic  opportunity  in  the  Far 
East. 

These  three  elements  are  inextricably  intertwined.  Unsolved,  increasing  chaos 
in  China,  increasing  domination  of  China  by  Japan,  and  ruinous  rivalry  among  the 
powers  are  certain,  and  another  world-war  is  altogether  likely,  the  outcome  and  con- 
sequences of  which  none  can  foretell. 

No  real  solution  is  possible  that  does  not  grapple  with  the  whole  situation  in  a 
single  comprehensive  plan.  Fortunately  many  careful  students  have  long  been  study- 
ing this  vast  and  intricate  problem.  The  main  outlines  of  the  general  policy  now 
needed  are  fairly  clear. 


VL  Constructive  Suggestions 


A.  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES 

CERTAIN  fundamental  principles  need, 
first  of  all,  to  be  accepted  by  the  nations 
interested  in  the  Far  East,  such  as  the 
following : 

I.  Abandonment  by  all  the  powers  of  their 
rivalry  for  private  opportunity^  in  and  control 
of  Chinese  territory  and  national  resources. 

2.  Agreement  by  all  the  powers  that  in  all 
their  dealings  with  China  and  Chinese  interests, 
they  will  act  together. 

3.  Agreement  by  all  the  powers  that  China’s 
own  welfare  and  rights  must  take  precedence 
of  all  other  considerations  in  deteimiining  what 
they  shall  do  for  and  ask  of  China. 

4.  Recognition  by  all,  of  Japan’s  rightful 
position  of  special  interest  and  special  responsi- 
bility in  the  Far  East. 

5.  Joint  adoption  of  peaceful  methods  for 
the  settlement  of  every  dispute  that  may  arise 
between  the  western  nations  and  China,  between 
the  western  nations  and  Japan  and  between  the 
western  nations  themselves. 

6.  Repudiation  of  the  principle  of  militar- 
istic coercion  as  a means  for  economic  expan- 
sion or  control. 

B.  SOME  CONCRETE  APPLICATIONS 

There  must,  of  course,  be  concrete  applica- 
tion of  these  principles.  They  might  Avell  take 
such  forms  as  the  following: — 

1.  The  formation  by  the  nations  of  an  In- 
ternational Far  Eastern  Commission  in  which 
all  the  powers  having  interests  in  the  Far  East 
shall  be  suitably  represented,  namely,  China, 
Japan,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France  and  perhaps  two  or  three  others. 

2.  The  transmission  to  this  Commission  by 
all  the  powers  of  full  information  regarding 
every  treaty  and  every  transaction  between 
China  and  such  powers  in  virtue  of  which  they 
are  making  claims  of  special  rights,  conces- 
sions, privileges  and  the  like. 

3.  The  adoption  of  plans  and  methods  by 
the  Commission  by  which  as  soon  as  may  be 
practicable,  all  foreign  troops  and  foreign 
police  shall  be  withdrawn  from  Chinese  soil  and 
actual  sovereignty  shall  be  restored  completely 
to  China.  During  the  period  in  which  China 
is  qualifying  herself  for  taking  over  these  re- 


sponsibilities, the  Commission  might  well  organ- 
ize an  international  police  force  consisting  of 
Chinese  whose  highest  officers  alone  might  per- 
haps for  a time  have  to  be  foreign. 

4.  Abolition  of  “extraterritoriality”  and 
restoration  to  China  of  complete  judicial,  ad- 
ministrative and  tariff  autonomy,  as  soon  as 
China  qualifies  herself  to  take  over  these  duties 
and  responsibilities. 

5.  Adoption  of  methods  of  amortization  by 
which  China  may  in  time  recover  complete  own- 
ership of  all  mines,  railways  and  other  prop- 
erties in  China  thus  protecting  and  rewarding 
every  honest  investment  of  foreign  capital  in 
China. 

6.  Rejection  of  alignment  with  partisan  pol- 
itics in  China.  No  foreign  intervention  by 
military  or  financial  assistance  should  be 
granted  or  allowed  to  any  Chinese  party  or 
faction.  China  should  be  allowed  to  settle  her 
own  problems  of  national  government  without 
hindrance  or  help  from  foreign  powers. 

7.  Acceptance  and  honest  enforcement  of 
the  principle  of  the  “open  door”  in  the  largest 
sense.  No  part  of  China  should  be  held  by  any 
foreign  government  or  interest  as  a private  pre- 
serve for  its  own  products  or  investment  of 
capital.  China’s  own  laws  dealing  with  inter- 
national trade  should  be  absolutely  free  from 
international  partiality  or  favoritism. 

C.  NAVAL  POWER  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

But  in  addition  to  the  creation  of  an  Inter- 
national Far  Eastern  Commission,  the  Powers 
should  give  occular  evidence  of  their  honest  de- 
termination to  abandon  the  use  of  naval  power 
in  the  Pacific  to  coerce  either  China  or  Japan 
or  one  another  in  regard  to  Far  Eastern  mar- 
kets, trade  routes  or  political  interests.  The 
manifest  way  to  do  this  is  to  permanently  \vith- 
draw  from  the  Pacific  their  super-dreadnoughts 
and  battleships  and  to  agree  that  under  no  cir- 
cumstances shall  they  be  allowed  to  enter  cer- 
tain specified  areas,  described  by  latitude  and 
longitude.  A large  reduction,  moreover,  of  the 
naval  bases  of  occidental  nations  in  the  Far 
East  would  go  far  to  convince  Japan  and  China 
of  the  honesty  and  good-will  of  their  new  pol- 
icies, to  allay  suspicion  among  themselves  and 
to  inaugurate  the  new  regime  under  the  most 
wholesome  psychological  conditions. 

Occidental  nations  should  recognize  that  the 
military  and  naval  coercion  of  the  Far  East 


18 


can  have  only  one  final  result — the  development 
of  piilitary  and  naval  power  in  the  Far  East  by 
which  to  protect  themselves  from  Occidental 
aggression  and  oppression.  As  a recent  writer 
has  aptly  stated  the  case — “If  the  Western 
Powers  attempt  to  ‘isolate’  or  ‘encircle’ 
Japan,  they  will  only  succeed  in  Prussianizing 
her.”  And  this  same  principle  applies  also  in 
the  relations  of  Japan  and  China.  If  Japan 
continues  to  hold  and  increase  her  domination 
of  China  by  her  superior  military  power,  she 
will  finally  succeed  in  militarizing  her. 

D.  LAWLESS  NATIONS 

The  chief  obstacle  to  the  foregoing  proposals 
is  the  dread  suspicion  that  some  nation  may  not 
play  fair ; that  its  unprincipled  diplomats  by 
secret  arrangements  with  unprincipled  Chinese 
officials — as  has  often  happened  in  the  past — 
may  secure  advantages  for  their  nationals  to 
the  detriment  of  the  rest.  Such  a danger  may 
not  be  ignored.  Human  history  is  full  of  such 
experience.  Treacherj"  and  intrigue  almost 
seem  to  be  ineradicable  elements  of  human 
nature. 

The  remedy,  however,  for  such  a situation  is 
for  all  law-abiding  nations  by  joint  action  to 

VII*  Advantages  of  the 

The  advantages  of  the  policy  and  program 
presented  in  the  foregoing  pages  are 
many  and  great.  They  are  in  truth  of 
vital  importance  to  China,  to  Japan,  and  also 
to  all  the  nations. 

To  China.  By  these  means  and  probabl}'  by 
them  alone  can  China  hope  to  secure  complete 
recovery  of  her  sovereignty,  of  her  territories 
and  of  her  judicial  and  tariff  autonomy.  Pro- 
tected from  danger  of  foreign  invasions  or  sin- 
ister peaceful  penetration,  fear  would  be  re- 
moved and  the  moral  and  practical  energies  of 
the  nation  could  be  devoted  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a stable  government  and  to  the  solution 
of  her  economic,  industrial  and  other  problems. 
China  would  thus  secure  safety  and  justice  with- 
out being  compelled  to  arm  herself  heavily  as 
every  modern  State  has  been  compelled  to  do. 
Her  vast  resources  could  then  be  expended 
wholly  upon  productive  enterprises  rather  than 
upon  armaments. 

To  Japan.  All  the  justifiable  objectives  that 
Japan  has  been  struggling  for  in  the  Far  East 
would  be  guaranteed  to  her  by  the  joint  action 


bring  the  culprit  into  court  as  soon  as  dis- 
covered, try  it,  judge  it  and  inflict  an  appro- 
priate penalty  by  process  of  law.  In  the  exe- 
cution of  a judgment  so  reached  the  united 
power  of  the  Powers  should  be  utilized.  The 
same  principles  should  be  and  can  be  applied 
for  maintaining  security  and  justice  between 
nations  as  have  been  found  to  work  quite  well 
among  individuals. 

It  will  not  do  for  all  nations  to  become  law- 
less merely  because  one  has  broken  the  law. 
That  road  leads  only  to  chaos,  tragedy  and 
destruction.  Law-abiding  nations  must  estab- 
lish international  law,  provide  for  national 
security  and  international  justice  and  must  be 
prepared  to  enforce  international  law  when 
necessary.  Under  such  circumstances  the  dan- 
ger of  deliberate  breaking  of  international 
laws  and  agreements  by  any  one  nation  is  ex- 
ceedingly slight. 

We  are  beginning  to  see  that  the  modern  or- 
ganization of  society  and  of  international  rela- 
tions has  created  a new  possibility  of  interna- 
tional coercion  neither  military  nor  naval — 
namely,  the  “economic  boycott.”  A lawless 
nation  can  now  be  effectively  penalized  without 
resort  to  the  destructive  procedures  of  war- 
fare and  wholesale  slaughter  of  fellowmen. 

Policy  Here  Proposed 

of  the  nations.  No  longer  would  she  need  to 
maintain  her  expensive  arm}^  and  navy  to  as- 
sure safety,  justice  and  economic  opportunity. 
Stability"  and  orderliness  of  government  in 
Cliina  would  give  to  Japan  opportunity  for 
that  large  trade  with  China  which  her  geo- 
graphical proximity,  her  knowledge  of  the 
Chinese  language,  and  her  industrial  efficiency 
make  certain  and  winch  her  own  industrial  and 
economic  needs  make  necessary'.  She  would 
have  unhampered  access  to  raw  materials  in 
China  and  also  to  the  enormous  markets  of 
China  for  her  industrial  products.  AVith  China 
developing  securely  as  an  industrial  and  com- 
mercial nation  having  no  need  of  nor  tendencies 
toward  militarization,  a profound  apprehen- 
sion would  be  removed  from  the  mind  of  every 
thoughtful  Japanese.  Japan  would,  moreover, 
secure  courtesy  of  treatment  and  equalitv  of 
status  which  are  essential  to  the  maintenance  of 
good-will  and  friendship  between  her  and  the 
nations  of  the  West. 

To  Other  Nations.  The  policy  and  program 
proposed  above  would  prevent  the  dangerous 
competition  in  China  of  powerful  rival  nations. 


19 


Each  would  have  its  fair  opportunity  and 
would  not  fear  unfair  competition. 

Confidence  between  the  nations  would  develop 
with  growing  experience ; the  abandonment  of 
large  navies  and  expensive  naval  bases  in  the 
Pacific  would  inspire  still  further  mutual  con- 
fidence, promote  more  cordial  co-operation  and 
lead  to  still  further  reduction  of  armament — - 
a circle  of  reactions,  in  this  case,  not  vicious, 
but  beneficent. 

The  danger  of  another  world  war,  because 

A p p e 

On  November  16,  1921,  the  Chinese  Delega- 
tion to  the  Conference  on  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ments gave  to  the  press  the  following  statement : 

“In  conformity  with  the  agenda  of  the  Con- 
ference, the  Chinese  Government  proposes  for 
the  consideration  of  and  adoption  by  the  Con- 
ference the  following  general  principles  to  be  ap- 
plied in  the  determination  of  the  questions  re- 
lating to  China : 

Principles  to  Be  Applied 

“(la)  The  Powers  engage  to  respect  and  ob- 
serve the  territorial  integrity  and  political  and 
administrative  independence  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public. 

“(b)  China  upon  her  part  is  prepared  to  give 
an  undertaking  not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  por- 
tion of  her  territory  or  litteral  to  any  Power. 

“(2)  China,  being  in  full  accord  with  the 
principle  of  the  so-called  open  door  or  equal  op- 
portunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
the  nations  having  treaty  relations  with  China, 
is  prepared  to  accept  and  apply  it  in  all  parts 
of  the  Chinese  Republic  without  exception. 

“(3)  With  a view  to  strengthening  mutual 
confidence  and  maintaining  peace  in  the  Pacific 
and  the  Far  East,  the  Powers  agree  not  to  con- 
clude between  themselves  any  treaty  or  agree- 
ment directly  affecting  China  or  the  general 
peace  in  these  regions  without  previously  noti- 
fying China  or  giving  to  her  an  opportunity 
to  participate. 

“(4)  All  special  rights,  privileges,  immuni- 
ties, or  commitments,  whatever  their  character 


of  rivalry  for  the  possession  of  China  and  her 
boundless  wealth,  would  be  averted.  All  the 
nations  would  share  in  the  prosperity  of  a 
wholesomely  developing,  peaceful  and  prosper- 
ous China. 

In  carrying  out  and  putting  into  effective 
operation  the  broad  principles  of  justice  and 
humanity  that  are  essential  to  right  interna- 
tional relations,  none  should  be  more  interested 
and  active  than  the  Christians  and  Churches 
of  America. 

n d i X 

or  contractual  basis,  claimed  by  any  of  the 
Powers  in  or  relating  to  China  are  to  be  de- 
clared, and  all  such  or  future  claims  not  so  made 
known  are  to  be  deemed  null  and  void.  The 
rights,  privileges,  immunities,  and  commitments, 
now  known  or  to  be  declared,  are  to  be  examined 
with  a view  to  determining  their  scope  and 
validity,  and,  if  valid,  to  harmonizing  them  with 
one  another  and  with  the  principles  declared 
by  this  Conference. 

“(5)  Immediately,  or  as  soon  as  the  circum- 
stances will  permit,  existing  limitations  upon 
China’s  political,  jurisdictional,  and  administra- 
tive freedom  of  action  are  to  be  removed. 

“(6)  Reasonable,  definite  terms  of  duration 
are  to  be  attached  to  China’s  present  commit- 
ments, which  are  witliout  time  limits. 

“(7)  In  the  interpretation  of  instruments 
granting  special  rights,  or  privileges,  the  well 
established  principle  of  construction  that  such 
grants  shall  be  strictly  construed  in  favor  of  the 
grantors,  is  to  be  observed. 

“(8)  China’s  rights  as  a neutral  are  to  be 
fully  respected  in  future  wars  to  which  she  is 
not  a party, 

“(9)  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  the  peace- 
ful settlement  of  international  disputes  in  the 
Pacific  and  the  Far  East. 

“(10)  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  future 
conferences  to  be  held  from  time  to  time  for  the 
discussion  of  international  questions  relative  to 
the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,  as  a basis  for  the 
determination  of  common  policies  of  the  signa- 
tory powers  in  relation  thereto,” 


Price,  25  cents  per  copy. 

For  10  or  more,  15  cents  each. 


